INTRODUCTION
The quality of group decision-making is enhanced with diverse opinions. Functionally diverse teams are more innovative, set clearer strategies, are more likely to react to competition, and are quicker to adapt to organizational changes (Dizin, 2016) .
The topic of diversity has been studied for many years and is still the interest of many authors within a different field of research. The concept of diversity is vast; Williams and O'Reilly (1998) define it, as 'any attribute that people use to tell themselves that another person is different'. Diversity is traditionally conceptualized in terms of visible differences such as age, gender, and race (Hicks- Some authors attempt to investigate and describe benefits and costs of diversity, based on physiological studies on human characteristic, cultures, races and background. As Ferreira (2010) points out, people from different backgrounds and with different life experiences are likely to approach similar problems in different ways and gain to different resources; diverse groups foster creativity and produce a greater range of perspectives and solutions (e.g., Wiersema and Bantel, 1992; Watson et al., 1993) . On the other hand, diversity could also increase the costs: conflicts, lack of cooperation and communication between the directors, unqualified managers and so on. have characteristics Since member's specific been considered fundamental to understand the dynamic of boards and member's behaviour, many authors have focused their attention on a specific study They gender. is that diversity feature of and style leadership different personality traits according to the presence of a female or male manager. Some studies underline that the presence of women on boards is still limited (Lee and James, 2007; Burgess and Threnou, 2002) and others try to investigate the reasons behind this scarce involvement, observing the social context, the social role of women, the status, the psychosocial processes underlying the ideological construction of a male superiority, and pre-existing social networks (Hillman et al., 2007; Ibarra, 1993; Smith, 2002) . Women tend to have interpersonally oriented and democratic styles, while men tend to be taskoriented, have an autocratic style and act more aggressively (Eagly et al., 2003) . Women in social situations smile and laugh more than men, use their bodies more expressively (Anderson and Blanchard, 1982; Carli, 1990 We expect that diversity on BoD reduce EM practice, helping firms to be more ethical. Similarly, we expect that diversity inside of BSA reduces EM behaviours. Our findings show that, while diversity within the BoD seems to be irrelevant, diversity within the BSA seems to reduce EM. Specifically, looking at the BoD, gender diversity and level of education are not significantly associated with EM, while the financial expertise of directors is significantly and positively associated with EM. At the same time, focusing on the BSA, the presence of female and the presence of auditors who are professional accountants and also academic professors are associated with lower EM.
Our results contribute to extending literature on diversity in the particular field of corporate governance. Differently, from previous studies, we focus also on diversity in control system, through the analyses of BSA, emphasizing its central role in the corporate governance structure. Moreover, in this research, we take into consideration particular characteristics of diversity as the level of education and the degree of experience.
The paper is structured as follow. Section 2 reviews the literature and section 3 shows the hypotheses development. In section 4 we present the methodological design and in section 5 we describe the sample. Section 6 proposes our results and section 7 discusses them and concludes. More in-depth, diversity has been studied by previous researchers considering only the gender point of view. Women have always fought to gain their positions; they were considered the minority group and they did not have the same opportunities as men in a career context, indeed they face more barriers to become leaders (Eagly and JohannensenSchmidt, 2001 ). While Chaganti (1986) and Powell (1990) find no significant differences in management decision-making values or styles between man and women, Birley (1988) , Sexton and Bowman-Upton (1990) find more similarities than differences in personality traits. Hudgens and Fatkin (1985) , Johnson and Powell (1994) find that male and female are equally capable of performing in terms of achieving outcomes. Eagly and Johnson in 1990 conduct a laboratory experiments and they find that women tend to manifest relatively interpersonally oriented and democratic styles, whereas men tend to manifest relatively taskoriented and autocratic style. Women are better nonverbal encoders than men as well as better decoders. In social situations, women smile and laugh more than men, use their bodies more expressively and show more involvement with others behaviour (Eagly, 1993) . Women leaders tend to be more people-oriented, democratic, consultative, showing interpersonally oriented behaviour and concern for other people's satisfaction as compared to men (Lamsa and Sintonen, 2001).
LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of diversity
Diversity and earnings management
For several years, many types of research have investigated the issue of differences within corporate BoD and BSA (Daily et al., 1999; Kanter, 1977) . Some papers consider the topic of diversity not only from the gender diversity perspective but also from differences in terms of age, race, culture, competence and expertise (Adams and Overall diversity, in terms of gender, age, expertise, nationality and so on, offers valuable and interesting opportunities for research on governance structure.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Our analysis focuses on the Italian context due to the peculiarities of the ownership and corporate governance structure and the limited role of stock market (Melis, 2000) . The Italian Latin or Traditional system (Section 2380 and following of the Italian Civil Code) requires that shareholders' meeting appoints two main boards: the BoD and the BSA. As Fama and Jensen (1983) affirm "an effective system for decision control implies that the control of decision is to some extends separate from the management of decision". The BoD makes decisions on shareholders' behalf, helps firms to reach their goals and is responsible for managing firm's resources. BSA instead is in charge of the control of firms' compliance with the law and by the-laws, the respect of good managing practice and the adequacy of organizational, administrative and accounting systems adopted. BSA represents a peculiarity of the Italian governance and its importance is increasing especially after some financial scandals occurred during the last years. Moreover, in terms of gender, the Italian Law n.120/2011 promotes gender balance in governing boards of listed companies, forcing firms to appoint at least one-third of female.
As known, when cooperating parties have different goals and desires, an agency problem could occur (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) could concern conflict of interest between managers and shareholders or majority and minorities. In the first case, managers are tempted to manipulate earnings in their own interest to extract shareholders' wealth, while, in the second one, controlling shareholders may have the incentive and the ability to expropriate minority. We assume either that managers, after their appointment, act in favour of their own interests at the expense of the shareholders' wealth or that they represent the controlling parties and make decisions to the detriment of the minorities.
Bearing in mind the characteristics of the context, the paper investigates if diversity within the BoD and BSA helps to reduce the manipulation of earnings. We develop our hypotheses relying on the agency theory, helpful to understand the problem of agency and opportunistic behaviour at the governance level. Based on the previous literature about diversity and EM we develop the following hypothesis:
H1: Board of director's diversity is related to lower earnings management.
H2: Board of Statutory Auditor's diversity is related to lower earnings management.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We measure the signed abnormal accruals following the Francis and Wang (2008) model. To test our hypotheses we run the regression model in equation (1):
where: ACC = (earnings before extraordinary itemscash flow from operation) / total assets. WC = working capital as (current assets -cash and short-term investment) -(current liabilitiesdebt in current liability). SALES = sales. DEP = depreciation. GPPE = gross property plant equipment / total assets t-1. ASSET = total assets. Hypotheses are tested with the Regression model in equation (2) 
SAMPLE
In the sample, we randomly select 121 non-financial companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange as of 6 February 2017 (unbalanced sample). Our analysis considers the periods 2008, 2011 and 2016. We start with the whole population of Italian listed companies and exclude financial companies, banks and insurance companies due to their particular activity and regulation. We consider only companies that are listed during the whole years of analysis (2008, 2011 and 2016) and we also have kept out companies for which, even only in some period, we have missing corporate governance data. Definitively, we have 223 observations for the BoD and 224 observations for the BSA.
The particular years considered in our analyses have been suggested by a provision of the Italian Civil code that imposes that members of both boards are appointed for three years; for this reason we collect data for the years 2008, 2011 and 2016 in order to capture the changes in the management and investigate possible changes in EM practices. Moreover, during the year 2012, listed companies are forced to appoint members based on the Italian Gender Quota (Law 120/2011), thus we investigate if and how the presence of women is associated with the earnings management.
We hand-collected data about BoD and BSA member's characteristics from the Corporate Governance Reports and from directors' curricula. We obtain financial data from the Aida Bureau Van Dijk database and from financial reports. Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics. The mean of Earnings management is -0.182. The average proportion of female directors within the BoD is 0.157 while the average proportion of female within the BSA is 0.161; the proportion is quite low, in fact as we said before the Law requires a certain percentage of female on board from the year 2012. Education on average is 1.659 indicating that most of the members on the board have a bachelor or master degree. The expertise of BoD is 0.566 indicating that half of the firms in our sample have at least one professional accountant on their board. Most of the directors attend all the BSA meetings as the variable Diligence BSA indicates 0.778. Less than half of the firms in our sample have at least one director who is not only accountant or lawyer but also an academic professor; the average of Expertise BSA is indeed 0.373. Table 2 illustrates the univariate correlation between variables. The expertise of BoD members is positively correlated with the level of education on BoD; female on BSA id negatively correlated with the earnings management as expected and positively correlated with the level of education on BoD and expertise of BoD members. VIF is well below 5, so we conclude that there are no problems of multicollinearity. 6. RESULTS Table 3 presents the results of the first hypothesis on the relationship between BoD diversity and EM. First, we regress EM and BoD diversity and, even though we expected a negative and a significant association between the presence of female on board, the level of education and EM, we find negative coefficients but not statistically significant. The expertise of BoD directors is significant and positive (coefficient = 0.058), indicating that, boards where at least one member is a professional accountant, appear more related to EM. This unexpected result could be explained through the majors financial and accounting skills of managers. Table 4 Another interesting result shows that the variable Expertise on BSA is negative related to EM (coefficient = -0.101; p-value = 0.055) meaning that, BSA directors who are not only financial experts, accountant or lawyer but also academic professors, curb EM. Though the coefficient of Diligence BSA is negative but the variable is not statistically significant we cannot conclude any relation between the diligence on BSA and EM. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Inspiring by the Italian context and its peculiarities, we focus our analysis on some characteristics of diversity within governance boards (BoD and BSA), in a sample of listed companies for the years 2008, 2011 and 2016.
Many studies have analysed characteristics of diversity within boards of administration and control from a different perspective but the results are different and, sometimes, in conflict. Numerous researches have investigated the association between diversity on board and firm performances, focusing in particular on the board of management like a board of directors (Terjesen et al., 2016; RegueraAlvarado et al., 2017). Despite BoD has been properly investigated in the literature, few studies focus their attention on monitoring boards. Thus, our study attempts to feel the gap existing in the literature, both through an analysis on unexplored characteristics of diversity and also considering the peculiar Italian control committee (BSA). It is interesting to notice a negative association between EM and two proxies of diversity within the BSA: the presence of female and the expertise. This means that having female members and academic professors in the BSA help in reducing EM behaviours.
Our findings are relevant for investors, both controlling and minority shareholders, who should pay attention to the specific characteristics of managers and spend more time to the appointment phase. This could help them to reduce the agency conflict and better safeguard their own interests, avoiding earnings manipulation.
Our research is not exempted from limitations. The sample includes only one country, i.e., Italy, reducing the generalizability of our results, even though they are meaningful for the reasons explained before. We measure EM following the Francis and Wang (2008) model; the same research questions could be investigated using other EM models to compare different results. Finally, some diversity variables could be measured otherwise (e.g ExperticeBSA and ExpertiseBoD).
Considering the crucial role of monitoring boards for the corporate governance system, an interesting further analysis could take into account diversity of the Internal Control Committee. Moreover, since the Law 120/2011 is still in place, some studies could monitor how boards change across a wider period of time. We think this study can inspire research on corporate governance and diversity in other countries due to the importance of the topic worldwide, also with a cross-country analysis between nations with the different corporate governance structure. Furthermore, an interesting further step could study diversity and its contribution to the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
